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The Establishment and Administration of
Pension Plans in the Labor Relations Process
Robert John Hickey*
Since World War II, pension plans have become an important part
of the benefits bargained for in the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. The author here analyzes the role of pension plans in
the labor relations process, federal legislative regulation of pension
plans, and relevant court decisions. He concludes that collectively
bargainedpension plans will produce problems in the future which are
now only beginning to appear.

I. INTRODUCrION
The purpose of this article is to analyze the role of pension plans'
in the labor relations process. The earliest pension plans had their
origin in the early nineteenth century and were pioneered by fraternal

associations established and operated by and for the employees.2 The
advent of unions on the labor scene resulted in the union, instead
of the fraternal association, administering the program. As for employer pension plans, the union leaders feared that such programs
were only a devious employer's device to prevent unionization. 3 Thus,
prior to World War II, employer pension plans were usually unilaterally instituted. However, beginning in 1942 collective bargaining

for pension plans began to achieve major momentum. Among the
circumstances which combined to produce this result were the tax4

deduction allowed the employer for contribution to these programs;

* A.B., Providence College; LL.B., Harvard University; attorney, National Labor Relations Board. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily represent those of the National Labor Relations Board or any of its Members.
1. The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act § 3(a), 72 Stat. 997 (1958), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. V, 1959-63), defines the term "employee pension
benefit plan" as "any plan, fund, or program which is communicated or its benefits
described in writing to the employees, and which was heretofore or is hereafter
established by the employer or by an employee organization, or by both, for the
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, by the purchase of
insurance or annuity contracts or otherwise, retirement benefits, and includes any
profit-sharing plan which provides benefits at or after retirement."
2. LATi En, INDTUsTRAL PENSION SYsTEMs IN THE UNTED STATES AND CANADA
(1932).
3. O'Nzm, MoDERN PENsioN PLANS (1947); Rowe & Paine, Pension Plans Under
Collective Bargaining, 76 Mo. LAB. Pnv. 237, 484, 714 (1953); Comment, 59 Y.Arx
L.J. 678 (1950).
4. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 137, 56 Stat. 836.
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the National War Labor Board policy of freezing cash pay raises
while increasing compensation in the form of fringe benefits;- and
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, sustained by the
within the statutory scope of the
courts, that pensions were properly
6
employer's duty to bargain.
II.

PENSIONS AS

N ArNrn-UNIoN WEAPON

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has held that statements by an employer warning the employees that the employer
would not negotiate concerning a pension plan or that it would discontinue the operation of a plan initiated by the employer if the union
won an election to represent its employees violates section 8(a) (1)
of the National Labor Relations Act since such warnings constitute
a clear threat of economic reprisal.' There is no less a violation if
the employer couches his language in the form of an opinion (e.g.,
statements that the employees will probably lose their pension plan
if the union gets into the plant).8 However, an employer could note
that the union seeking to represent the employees has failed to secure
pension plans in other plants where it is the collective bargaining
representative. 9
Not only threats, but also promises of benefits may constitute
interference. During a union campaign to organize a plant, an
employer cannot present and publish a pension plan or promise
improvements in an existing plan if the initiation or improvement
is conditioned on rejection or abandonment of union membership or
activities. 10 Obviously, conduct including strategically timing the
announcement of the retroactive effect of a profit-sharing plan would
be an unfair labor practice since it would amount to an attempt to
buy the employee's vote." But an employer does not violate 8(a) (1)
by stating in pre-election remarks that he contemplates giving the
employees such benefits, and where the employer does not condition
benefits on the defeat of the union in the election.' 2
There is one further area where the employer cannot use a pension
plan as device to influence the employees' choice of their own bar5. Stabilization Act of October 2, 1942, ch. 578, § 10, 56 Stat. 768; Exec. Order
No. 9250, 7 Fed. Reg. 787 (1942); Amended Exec. Order No. 9381, 8 Fed. Reg. 13003
(1943).
6. Inland Steel Co. v. NLBB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
960 (1949).
7. Como Plastics, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 151 (1963).
8. Elias Brothers' Big Boy, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1158 (1962).
9. Trial Examiner's Decision in Imco Container Company, 5-CA-2425, NLRB (1964).
10. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 393 (1961).
11. Homedale Tractor and Equipment Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1033 (1952).
12. Western Reserve Telephone Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 755 (1962).
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gaining representatives. An employer cannot assist a minority union
or an outside union by conduct aimed at weakening the majority
union. The Board has held that an employer, unlawfully assisted a
minority union in violation of section 8(a) (2) by cutting off payments to the majority union's pension fund.13 Nor can an employer
encourage membership in an employer-favored union by signing a
contract with it which includes payments to a pension fund at a time
when an outside union is trying to organize the employees. 14 Payment to one union by an employer during a rival union's campaign is
always suspected by the Board. In fact, the Board has held that a
payment to a union in connection with services involving pension
activities during such a campaign constitutes illegal support. 15

III. ThE

NATuRE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A PENSION

A. The Nature of Pension Plans
There are four ways in which a trust can be viewed: a gratuity, a
unilateral contract, a deferred wage, or a charitable contribution.
The traditional view is that a noncontributory employer-instituted plan
does not give rise to an enforceable contract, but is in fact a mere
gratuity. 16 Under such a theory, an employee has no vested rights
in a plan until he begins to receive benefits. 17 In an effort to guarantee that the courts would find such plans to be gratuities, employers
have disclaimed liability by inserting clauses that declare the pensions
to be gratuities which create no enforceable right; clauses which
give broad powers to the employer, to amend, modify or terminate
the plan;' 8 and clauses giving the employer or the employer-appointed
trustees broad discretionary powers to determine eligibility and the
amount of benefits to be conferred.' 9
The courts which have found that these pensions are gratuities
have generally done so because of the presence of the following
factors: the granting of pensions was wholly voluntary on the part of
a company; the employee made no contributions to the fund; and
there was no provision that the pension was guaranteed.2 0 Of course,
13. Perry Coal Co., 125 N.L.R.B. No. 1256 (1959).
14. Koehler's Wholesale Restaurant Supplies, 139 N.L.R.B. 945 (1962).
15. Kresge Department Stores, 77 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1948).
16. McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610, 53 N.Y. Supp. 98 (1898),
aff'd, 167 N.Y. 530,60 N.E. 1115 (1901).
17. Dolan v. Heller Bros. Co., 30 N.J. Super. 440, 104 A.2d 860 (Ch. 1954).
18. Bromberg v. United Cigar Stores, 27 L.R.R.M. 2480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
The court held that such a clause is similar in effect to a gratuity clause.
19. Bowling v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 80 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
20. Umshler v. Umshler, 332 Ill. App. 494, 76 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1947).
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where there is an express disclaimer, the courts will include this
among the factors.
Because of the harshness of this result, courts have been reluctant
to construe these provisions in a way that would deprive employees
of their benefits. Courts have imposed an obligation on the employer
to administer his plan in good faith.21 Where the employer is granted
unilateral power to amend, modify, or terminate a plan, a court can
construe these provisions as giving the employer the power to exercise them only in a case of necessity and in good faith. And where
the clause provides that the employer or his trustees have discretion
to determine eligibility and benefits, the courts can inquire into the
exercise of that discretion to determine if there is fraud or bad faith. 22
In addition, courts have scrutinized these programs to see if the
employee has been unfairly induced by the employer to rely on the
promise of a pension.23 The court is applying the principle of promissory estoppel and granting recovery on the ground that the employee
relied on the expectation of a pension to his detriment. In a normal
case, the employer does expect the employee to rely upon the promise
of pension; otherwise his announcement would have no meaning.
Factors which the court could examine to determine if this doctrine
is applicable are the past practice of the employer in granting such a
benefit, the employee's lack of knowledge of the limitation on the
employer's liability, and the fact that the plan did not result from
collective bargaining. The court should not impose on the employee
the burden of showing that he would have accepted a better paying
position elsewhere were it not for the pension because of the obvious
inherent difficulty in proving this.
As an alternative to the gratuity theory, some courts have held
that a pension is a unilateral contract.2 Under this theory, a binding
obligation is created when the employer makes what amounts to an
offer by announcing the initiation of a plan and the employee
accepts the offer by fulfilling the requirement that he continue in
the employment of the employer for the requisite number of years.
Consideration may be found either in the longevity of service,2 which
is not assured the employer in the normal employment relation, and
the daily work of the employee.2 6 Since the major objective of the
employer in adopting this plan is said to be his desire to encourage
21. McNevin v. Solvary Process Co., supra note 16.
22. Supra note 19.

23. Schofield v. Zion's Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342
(1934).
24. Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956).

25. Ibid.
26. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, supra note 6.

PENSION PLANS

1964 ]

continuity of service, if the employee voluntarily leaves without completing the required service, the employer has gained no benefit
and would not be liable to the employee. This also would be true if
the employee was discharged for cause, but would not be if he was
discharged in bad faith, especially if he is discharged to avoid being
such circumstances, the employee ought to
paid the pension. Under
27
recover.
to
able
be
The third theory under which an employee covered by an employer's unilaterally instituted plan has been able to recover is that
of the deferred wage theory. This theory is similar to the unilateral
contract theory, but the emphasis here is on the daily work of the
employee. Under this theory, the employer withholds part of the
earnings of the employee and pays it after the employee has retired.
Consideration for the employer payment is the employee's remaining
a specified period of time with the employer. This theory is tied
to theories developed by the National Labor Relations Board concerning pensions as a mandatory subject of bargaining, discussed
below. One judge has reached this same result by inference from
the Internal Revenue Code. Judge Brown, concurring in Ball v. Victor
Adding Machine,28 declared:
And the idea that a Pension Trust expressly approved as was this one, by

the Internal Revenue Service as a plan qualified under .. . the 1954 Code,

§ 401 ...

is a mere gratuity or charitable enterprise ....

is completely out

of keeping with the philosophy and purpose of such plans as the means of
paying additional compensation to the covered employees in a way to afford
substantial and immediate tax advantages to the Employer and substantial

tax and monetary advantages to the employees....
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act requires the
employer and the employees' representative to bargain with each
other in good faith with respect to "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." While, within that area, neither
party is legally obligated to yield, the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Wooster Division of Borg-Warner' held that there is a class of lawful bargaining subjects which fall outside of "wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment" over which the parties may bargain, if
they choose, but a disagreement as to these cannot be made valid
grounds for refusing to sign a contract covering subjects within the
area of mandatory bargaining. The Board, in a later case, Houston
Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., 30 interpreted Borg-Warner as setting forth two tests to aid in determining
27.
28.
29.
30.

Bos
236
356
143

v. United States Rubber Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 565, 224 P.2d 386 (1950).
F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1956).
U.S. 342 (1958).
N.L.R.B. 409 (1963).
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whether a subject of bargaining is mandatory; first, the subject matter
must settle a term or condition of employment, and second, the subject sought to be bargained about must regulate the relations between
the employer and the employees.
In the Inland Steel Company case, 31 the Board held that the employer engaged in an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)
(5) by failing and refusing to bargain with the union upon the
application or modification of the terms of a pension program which
was originally established prior to the employees' designation of a
statutory representative. The Board, in finding pensions a mandatory
subject of bargaining stated:
We find that matters affecting tenure of employment, like the respondent's
retirement rule, lie within the statutory scope of collective bargaining.
Any other view would remove bargaining with respect to such matters as
seniority and union security provisions from the conference to the picket
line. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically held that the statutory
scope of collective bargaining extends to matters involving discharge
actions....
The respondent claims that the term "wages" as used in the Act means the
"wages earned" by the employees for actual performances of work on
production activity, and that pension benefits are based on the economic
philosophy that holds that such benefits are not earned by expenditure of
productivity effort on the part of the employees, but are determined by
the length of time over which employees perform their work. We are of
the opinion, however, that regardless of the validity of this economic
philosophy of pension benefits, there is no basis for concluding that such a
narrow and technical definition of "wages" was intended by Congress in
delineating the statutory area of collective bargaining.
One of the broad purposes of the Act, as set forth in Section 1 thereof,
is to encourage collective bargaining to 'wages, rates, and the purchasing
power of wage earners" as a means of eliminating industrial strife. To
implement this objective, the Congress, in generally defining the ambit
of obligatory collective bargaining used not only the specific terms "rates
of pay" and "hours of employment" but also the broad generic and widespread phrase "wages and other conditions of employment... ." With due
regard for the aims and purposes of the Act and the evils which it sought to
correct, we are convinced and find that the term "wages" as used in Section
9(a) must be construed to include emoluments of value, like pensions and
insurance benefits, which may accrue to employees out of their employment
relationship....
Moreover, as indicated above, in all fields of law dealing with Congressional legislation for the protectioli of public rights, the term "wages"
has consistently -been construed to include increments, such as retirement
_-benefits or other types- of dismissal pay rights, which flow to employees
because of their longevity. Thus, in examining our statutory power under
Section 10(c) of the Act to "reinstate with back pay," we have, in effect,
31. Supra note 6.
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uniformly held that pensions and other "beneficial" insurance rights constitute
a part of the employee's real wages and have accordingly required restoration of those benefits as part of our make whole order. 32

Behind this holding lies the simple fact that the employees pay for
their own pensions. All labor costs which go to the employees are
wages. 33 The fact that they are deferred to a later date and are
subject to the condition that the employee loses his rights if he
does not meet other requirements of the plan does not make them
any less wages. In fact, today, both employers and unions bargain
about these plans as if they were wages. Both parties understand
that pensions are part of a wage package and are taken in lieu of
direct cash wages or other items of compensation.34
This does not mean that the employer receives no benefit from
his pension program. As Judge Magruder observed in New England
Telephone & Telegraph v. United States:3
The primary purpose of establishing a pension plan is to deal in an orderly
way with the problem of superannuation. The costs of superannuation
have to be met by the business in some way. In the absence of provision
for retirement of employees on a fair pension, experience has shown the
inevitable result to be that employees are kept on the payroll after their
usefulness has been impaired, the promotion of younger and more vigorous
employees is delayed, and there is a general lowering of efficiency in the
conduct of the business ....
Systematic retirement on pensions results in
removing superannuated employees from the payrolls and in improving the
morale and efficiency of the younger employees who thus have an added
incentive for remaining in the service of the company. The adoption of a
pension plan substitutes a new type of expense, namely, pension costs,
for the expense, not so easily measurable in dollars and cents, which must
somehow be borne by the business in the absence of an orderly handling
of the superannuation problem. It is widely believed that this substituted
expense results, on the whole, in a net gain for the company.

Thus, among the benefits the employer derives from the plan is the
increased efficiency in the orderly and painless retirement of superannuated personnel whose efficiency has been impaired.3 6 A well
devised and well established plan will infinitely improve morale and
may also help to develop and retain a superior work force by decreasing labor turnover.3 7 It will serve as a means of reducing strikes
32. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 77 N.L.R.B. 1, (1948).
33. NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952); Inland Steel
Co. v. NLRB, supra note 6.
34. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, supranote 6.
35. 53 F. Supp. 400, 409 (D. Mass. 1943).
36. O'NEm, MODERN PENSION PLANS 4-6 (1947).
37. Report and Recommendations of the Steel Industry Fact Finding Board, 13 L.A.
46, 86, 91 (1949).
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and promoting loyalty to the company. 38 In addition, it will help
attract better employees. Of course, from the employee's view, the
purpose of the plan is to provide income when age forces him to
retire.39
The Inland Steel ruling that pensions are mandatory subjects of
bargaining was logically extended to profit-sharing plans40 which are
simply a different manner of financing the employees during their
post-retirement period. This obligation to bargain extends, not only
to the amount to be paid upon retirement, but also to the method
of financing. One court has even held that a bargaining agent had
authority to enter into an agreement setting up a benefit program
and
providing for deduction from the employees' paychecks to finance
41
it.

This obligation to bargain imposes on the employer the duty to
submit its proposed plan to the union for consideration and then to
meet with the union, making it possible for the union to express
any opposition to the plan before the employer puts it into effect.4
Practical differences in negotiation about the plan do not affect the
employer's duty to bargain.4 3 The employer cannot insist that any
plan submitted by the union meet all the requirements of section
302 of the Labor Management Relations Act at the time of its initial
submission.4 While the employer must bargain, he need not make
concession to the union. An employer will not be held to have
refused to bargain where his position, although unyielding, is based
on considerations frankly and openly discussed.45
One problem that frequently arises under a union-negotiated plan is
that of trying to force the employer to pay over to the pension fund
the amount that he has agreed to contribute. In a recent decision,
Excello Dry Wall,46 the Board held that a clause requiring the
employer to establish a fund to insure contribution to a pension fund
was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. In this case, the union's
demand was an outgrowth of past delinquencies in which this employer had failed to make fund contributions for as long as fourteen
months, accumulating arrears in amounts equal to 5 months' payments.
It was this history that the union sought to deal with when it proposed
as one of the terms of the new contract the establishment of a wage
38. O'NEIL, op. cit. supra note 36, at 4-6.
39. EpsTEIN, THE CHALLENGE OF THE AGED 89-91 (1928).
40. Como Plastics, supra note 7.

41. Olsen v. Potlatch Forests, 200 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1953).
42. Square D, 105 N.L.R.B. 253 (1953).
43. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949).

44. Cheney California Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1963).
45. Old Line Life Insurance Co. of America, 96 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951).
46. 145 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 55 L.R.R.M. 1015 (1963).
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deposit to assure prompt and full payment of fringe benefit contributions and of the wages due the employees. The majority held that
whenever the demand may be construed as in the nature of a
performance bond, that demand is outside the area of a mandatory
subject of bargaining. The dissent, in rejecting this per se approach,
observed:
Consideration of the demand in the instant case in light of the foregoing
requires the conclusion that the "wage deposit" proposal of the union was a
"mandatory subject of bargaining" concerning which it could lawfully insist
to a state of impasse. Thus, it related to a benefit or security for the
employees. It dealt with wages of the employees and involved when and
how wages were to be paid to them. It was not payable to and for the
security of one of the contracting parties. Instead, it was a deposit to assure
timely payment to employees of wages and fringe benefits if the employer
failed to make such payment in the normal fashion. In other words, it was
not an indemnification of one of the parties for breach of the contract,
but was merely an alternative mode
of wage payments to the beneficiaries
47
of the contract, the employees.

The dissent also took note of the fact that since 1935 the Miller Act48
has required that all contractors on government construction contracts
exceeding 2,000 dollars furnish a payment bond as guarantee for wage
49
claims of affected employees.

Some courts have held pension funds to be charitable trusts. 50 A

ruling that these funds are charitable would place them under the
protection of the Attorney General for the state. Any legal action

taken in relation to them would be equitable in nature. 51 The logic
of this approach is questionable, for as an earned right paid in the
form of deferred compensation, they cannot be considered charitable
in nature. 52 Also, since the employer establishes the trust, it is often
difficult to regard him as a true trustee. 53 However, a number of
courts have held them to be charities because of the alleged indefiniteness about the beneficiaries who may qualify under a plan which
prescribes qualification for future participation and which has not yet

been terminated. But, at any given time, the beneficiaries, potential
47. Id. at 1018.
48. 49 Stat. 793, 40 U.S.C. § 270 (a)-(d) (1958).
49. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957).
50. Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948).
51. Szuch v. Lewis, 193 F. Supp. 831 (D.D.C. 1960).
52. Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958).
53. Hurd v. Illinois Bell Telephone, 136 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.
1955), aft'd,
234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956). In order for an employer to be held a trustee for his
employees, it must be established that the employer manifested an intention to make
himself trustee for his employees. The providing of a pension does not per se make
the employer a trustee for his employees. Even if it be determined the employer
intended to create a trust, the normal trustee would be the financial institution managing
the funds and not the employer.
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or actual, are always known. Although some of the potential beneficiaries may never become actual beneficiaries by reason of their
termination of employment before retirement, such a potential beneficiary has a legally protected interest in the pension fund. Another
difference lies in the purpose for which the trust is created. Here,
as noted above, the employer's purpose is not a charitable one, but
one to benefit himself.54
Some of the courts that have tried to tag the charitable label on
pension funds have done so because of a fear that they would be
invalid otherwise under the Rule Against Perpetuities. It is a rare
pension plan that fixes a termination date. Under the Rule Against
Perpetuities, a class gift will fail if the beneficial interest of any
member might not vest until after the period of a life in being plus
twenty-one years. 55 At first glance, it would appear that a pension
plan without a fixed date of termination would come under the rule.
However, the rule should not apply because a pension fund does not
come within the policy behind the rule, i.e., alienability of property.
In order to avoid a possibility that a court might misapply the rule,
a party should put a clause in the contract explaining this. Today,
specifically exempted these plans from the operation
most states have
56
of the statute.
B. Eligibility
Coverage by the plan does not necessarily follow from the employment relationship alone. An employee must fulfill certain criteria in
57
order to be covered by the plan and to participate in its benefits.
The minimum criteria which govern eligibility to participate in the
pension system include type of work, accummulated earnings, and the
attainment of a specified age and length of service 58 as an employee.5 9
They may be limited to a particular class or unit of employees. A
maximum age may also be imposed. These criteria might vary
depending on whether it is a single plant plan, an area plan, or a
multi-employer plan. The employee must be eligible at the time
the benefits are to be conferred. 60 The purpose of these requirements
54. Pavlovscak v. Lewis, 168 F. Supp. 839 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
55. 6 AMmiucAN LAw oF PROPERTY § 24:26 (Casner ed. 1952).
56. All states, except the following, exempt pensions from the application of the
Rule Against Perpetuities: Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming.
57. Garrity v. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund, 52 L.R.R.M. 2939 (Pa. Ct.
C. P. 1963).
58. Szuch v. Lewis, supra note 51 (one year in the industry immediately preceding
retirement); Pavlovscak v. Lewis, supra note 54 (regular employment in the industry).
59. He must be a bona fide employee, Kennet v. UMW, 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C.
1960), and must not be an independent contractor, Hescox v. Lewis, 55 L.R.R.M.
2217 (Ct. C.P. Pa. 1963).
60. Gambrell v. Lewis, 47 L.R.R.M. 2620 (Munic. Ct. App. Colo. 1961).
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is the exclusion of employees who may not be expected to remain with
the plan for any length of time.
The eligibility requirements for the fund can be specifically included in the trust agreement or the trust agreement can confer the
power of adopting rules and regulations governing eligibility directly
on the trustees.61 Decisions made in good faith pursuant to such a
provision are not reviewable.6 2 However, in order for the exercise of
this power to be final and conclusive, it must be spelled out in the
contract. 63 In any case, the court will impose an obligation on the
trustees to be reasonable in establishing these rules and regulations.6 4
There are certain limitations placed on the eligibility requirements.
An employer will violate section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act by maintaining a provision in a pension plan that denies
eligibility to union members.65 In Melville Confection, Inc.,66 the
Board held that an employer violated the act by maintaining and
continuing a profit-sharing plan for its employees which required as
a condition of participation that the employee not be represented by
a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Following
this line of reasoning, the Board has held 7 that where a credit system
is used, the employer cannot compute credits in such a manner as to
deny eligibility to union members.
Nor can the employer and the union bargain with respect to a
pension plan for union members only where the union is the exclusive
bargaining agent for the employees in the appropriate unit comprised of both union and nonunion members. 68 This would also mean
that the union cannot require membership in good standing as a
condition for participation in the plan.69 Where the employer contributes to a member-only fund, the Board can direct that the employer cease making such contributions without providing nonunion
members equivalent coverage and benefits and to make whole the
employees for any financial loss suffered by reason of his failure to
61. Bono v. Kramer, 191 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1963).
62. Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944).
63. Hobbs v. Lewis, supra note 52.
64. Powell v. Lewis, 48 L.R.R.M. 2151 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
65. Jim O'Donnell, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 1639 (1959).
66. 142 N.L.R.B. 1334 (1962), enforced, 327 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1964).
67. Toffenetti Restaurants Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1156 (1962), aff'd, 311 F.2d 219 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 977 (1963).
68. Progressive Kitchen Equipment Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 992 (1959).
69. Carty Heating Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1417 (1957); County Electric Co., 116
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1956); Jandel Furs, 100 N.L.R.B. 1390 (1952); Local 140, United
Furniture Workers of America, 109 N.L.R.B. 326 (1954). The fact that a plan might
discriminate against nonunion members can be raised only in an NLRB proceeding
and cannot be raised-under section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Van
Horn v. Lewis, supra note 50; Upholsterers International Union v. Leathercrafk 82
F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
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provide coverage and benefits comparable to those given the union
members. 0 By maintaining and enforcing a contract which grants
more advantageous working conditions, in the form of benefits, to
union-member employees, the employer violates 8 (a) (2) and (3) and
the union violates 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) since such conduct amounts
to unlawful discrimination against the nonunion members. It is no
defense that the provision was never enforced since the mere existence
of the clause has a natural tendency to encourage or discourage union
membership 7 ' and amounts to an inducement to nonmembers to seek
union membership.
In all these cases, the union was the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. By establishing a plan for its members only,
the union failed in its duty to represent all employees fairly. But
what about a minority union; can it bargain for its group alone? In
Reliable Newspapers,72 a case involving non-pension benefits, the
Board held that the employer could not bargain with a minority
union, even though there was no exclusive representative in the plant.
The court of appeals disagreed on the ground that the majority nonunion members had it within their power to correct the situation. A
solution to this problem would be to have two funds, one for union
members and one for nonunion members.
Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act also places
3
some limitations on the eligibility requirements. In Kroger v. Blassie,7
the court held that inclusion of trust employees as beneficiaries of a
joint employer-union welfare trust violates section 302(a) (5) since the
act does not include employees of trust proper as beneficiaries, but
requires that beneficiaries be employees of a contracting employer and
that this requirement may not be satisfied by bookkeeping transactions
within the trust itself designed to represent contributions to the trust
by the trust as an employer. On this same ground that beneficiaries
must be employees of a contributing employer, the court also held
that officers and employees of the union could not be included.
In addition, the pension planner also must be guided by section 401
of the Internal Revenue Code7 4 if he wants a qualified plan. Since,
under the Code, a plan must be for the exclusive benefit of employees
or their beneficiaries, partners and individual proprietors are excluded.
In order to prevent disqualification, the plan must meet either a
mathematical employee coverage test or the Internal Revenue Service
70. Northeast Coastal, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 441 (1959).
71. Bitoni Foods Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 767 (1960); Seaboard Terminal & Refrigeration Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1955).

72. 88 N.L.R.B. 659 (1950), enforcement denied, 187 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1951).
73. 225 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mo. 1964).

74. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.401 (1958).
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must find that the plan does not discriminate in favor of officers,
stockholders, supervisory or highly-paid employees. If the mathematical test is used, then the plan must cover either seventy per cent
of the employees, of whom the employer may exclude employees who
have been employed for less than a minimum period, and employees
who customarily work for less than twenty-four hours a week or for
less than five months a year; or eighty per cent of the eligible employees, provided seventy per cent or more of the remaining employees are eligible to participate in the plan.
If the plan fails to meet this test, it may still qualify ifits coverage
classification does not discriminate in favor of key employees. A plan
cannot use a formula which results in giving highly-paid employees
larger amounts in proportion to compensation than the lower-paid
employees.75 Again, to prevent discrimination, vesting is required
when the employee meets the plan's requirements, when the plan is
terminated, and where failure to vest will effect a prohibited discrimination. These and other provisions are designed to prevent a
prohibited group being the only ones eligible for benefits or to receive
a disproportionate share of the benefits.
C. Method of Contribution
Besides determining eligibility, the plan must determine the manner
of contribution. Normally, the employer pays a contribution to the
fund directly. However, for particular reasons, the employer and the
unions have sometimes insisted on a different manner of payment. The
problem has arisen under the Davis-Bacon Act,76 which requires the
payment of prevailing wage rates as determined by the Secretary of
Labor on federally-financed construction in excess of 2,000 dollars.
The prevailing wage is just that-wages alone. It does not include
other fringe benefits. So unless the employer included the pension
payment as direct wages, he could not compete with another employer
with higher wages, but a less overall wage package. 77 Under a situation like this, the union agrees to have the employer pay a wage
directly to the employee from whom a payment to a pension plan
would be deducted. However, because these are wages, the employees must pay a tax on them. 78 Two courts have upheld the power
to negotiate such plans.79 Section 302(c) (7) of the Labor Manage75. Treas. Reg. § 1-404 (a) (ii) (1958).
76. 46 Stat. 1494 (1931), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 276(a) (1958).
77. There are presently pending bills that would include fringe benefits, such as
pensions, in a Davis-Bacon determination of prevailing wages. S. 450, H.R. 404, 927,
2402, 2642, 4265, 4469, 6401, 6673, 8825, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
78. Query as to whether this plan could qualify under the Internal Revenue Code.
79. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Int'l Woodworkers, 108 F. Supp. 906 (D.C. Idaho

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 18

ment Relations Act indicates that this is permissible.
There is a problem under such a plan as to whether there must be
individual assignments. Where the contract specifically states that
the union should obtain individually signed authorizations for such
deductions, one court has held that the employees must individually
execute written authorizations. 80 Another court has indicated that the
union lacks the power by contract to bind the employees without
their consent or express ratification. 8'
D. Special Clauses Found in Pension Plans
Another clause commonly found in pension plans is one that
restricts alienation by making pension rights nonassignable. The purpose of such a clause is to prevent a pensioner's creditors from attaching it. Where the employee makes contributions to the plan or where
the employer makes contributions to the fund as deferred wages, the
employee is a settlor of the trust and it cannot be considered a spendthrift trust. However, some states have given this effect to pension
trusts. But even where this occurred, the pensioner's family has been
able to reach his interests in the fund for support purposes. In Thiel
v. Thiel,82 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the clause
should not bar recourse to the pension payments when this provides
the only reasonable asset for a wife's support in the state of her
residence. The court noted that the purpose of the exemption clause
is to relieve the pensioner from claims hostile to his needs and those
of his dependents and the pensioner has a duty to share his pension
with his wife.
Once a plan has been written, questions arise concerning approval
by either the shareholder or the union members. Since a pension
plan will create a binding obligation over a long period of time, a
corporation might want to condition its acceptance of the pension
plan on shareholder approval. Since a requirement of shareholder
approval might unduly burden the bargaining process, such a requirement might conflict with the policies of the NLRA.8 3 As for union
member approval, a Federal district court held in Davis v. Washington
1951), aff'd. sub nom., Olsen v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 200 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1953);
Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Local 7-116, Intl Woodworkers, 203 Ore. 342, 279 P.2d
508 (1955).
80. Int'l Woodworkers v. McCloud Lumber Co., 32 L.R.R.M. 373 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
81. Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Local 7-116, Int'l Woodworkers, supra note 79.
82. 41 N.J. 446, 197 A.2d 354 -(1964).
83. Compare Greene v. Holz, 148 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Section 8(a) (5)
requires an employer to bargain with his employees' representative in good faith. This
means that the employer cannot use dilatory tactics to delay bargaining and to dissipate
the union's strength. If shareholder, approval would unduly delay the bargaining
process, it should not be enforced as contrary to § 8(a) (5).
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State Carpenters,4 that union members do not have a right under
the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act to vote on a
pension plan since the relief sought in effect attempts to set aside
actions of the joint-bargaining committee which is not a labor organization for purposes of the LMRDA.
E. Qualifications
A plan must meet the requirements of section 302 of the Labor
Management Relations Act;8 section 4(a) of the Welfare and Pension
Plan Disclosure Act;86 and, if it intends to qualify for certain tax
benefits, the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.87 Section 302
restricts payments to employees' representatives, and applies to all
funds in which the union is the sole, or one of the trustees, and which
was created after 1946. Section 302(a) makes it unlawful for an
employer or association of employers or any person who acts as a
labor relations expert, adviser or consultant, to an employer or who
acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver any
money or other thing of value to any representative of any of his
employees, any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof,
which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership
any of the employees. Section 302(b) makes it unlawful for any
person to request, demand, receive or accept, or agree to receive or
accept any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or other thing
of value prohibited by subsection (a). Thus, any payment to a trust
will be characterized as a payment to a representative of the employees. The question here is whether payment to a trustee would be
considered a payment to an employees' representative. In United
Marine Division v. Essex TransportationCompany,88 the court held:
These trustees were not, in our judgment, representatives of the employees.
They were trustees of a welfare fund. It is true that they were chosen
half and half by the employers' association and this union. But we think

that when set up as a board . . . these individuals are not acting as

representatives of either union or employers. They are trustees of a fund
and have fiduciary duties in connection therewith as do any other trustees.

However, in a criminal case under this section, United States v.
11yan,89 the Court cast doubt upon this case by holding that "in using
the term 'representative' Congress intended that it include any persons
authorized by the employees to act for them in dealing with their
84. 47 L.R.R.M. 2245 (W.D. Wash. 1960).
85. 61 Stat. 157, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (Supp. V, 1959-63).
86. 72 Stat. 997 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (Supp. V, 1959-63).
87. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
88. 216 F.2d 410, 412 (3d Cir. 1954).
89. 350 U.S. 299, 302 (1956).
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employer." The Courfs decision could be read to include all trustees of
welfare funds since any trustee acting as a fiduciary must deal with
employers. But simply because trustees deal in labor relations, they
should not be considered to be labor organizations any more than
arbitrators. They are not established to function as a representative
of the employees or to be directed by them exclusively, even though
by the nature of their job they are subject to employee pressure. It
is still doubtful whether payments to a fund trustee who is also a
union trustee are legal.90
Section 302(c) (5) specifically exempts trust funds where the payments which are intended to be used for the purpose of providing
pensions for employees are made to a separate trust which provides
that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than
paying such pension or annuities; where the trust fund is established
for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees, their families and
dependents; where there is a detailed basis on which such payments
are to be made which is specified in a written agreement; where the
employees and the employers are equally represented in the administration of the fund; where the agreement contains a provision for
resolution of a deadlock by an impartial third person; and where the
agreement provides for inspection of an annual audit by interested
persons. If any of the above conditions are missing, the pension fund
does not qualify for exemption. It should be noted that a wilful
violation of 302(a) and (b) constitutes a misdemeanor and subjects
the violator to a fine of not more than 10,000 dollars, or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
If a plan wishes to qualify under the Internal Revenue Code, section
401(a), it must meet the following requirements: The pension plan
must provide, as a method of deferred compensation, systematic
payments of definitely determinable benefits to employees over a
period of years after retirement. It must be for the exclusive benefit
of the employees or their beneficiaries. Such a plan cannot benefit
partners who are not employees. Neither are partners to be credited
for services as partners prior to becoming employees. Benefits under
the plan must be definitely determinable, which means that they
cannot be suspended after retirement without cause. Life insurance,
disability, and death benefits may be provided only as an incidental
feature of a pension plan.91 Contributions made either to a trust or
90. In one decision that came down after United States v. Ryan, supra note 89, the
court held that a fund did constitute a representative. Local 2, Plasterers v. Paramount
Plastering, Inc., 310 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1962), affirming 195 F. Supp. 287 (S.D. Cal.
1961).
91. A benefit is incidental where the insurance protection is not greater than 100
times the monthly annuity.
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paid as premiums under insurance contracts must meet the qualification that the plan must be funded.
Advance funding is permitted where it is minor in relation to the
actuarial liability under the plan, where there is no possibility of
the reversion of a substantial amount to the employer on termination
of the plan, and if advance funding is exclusively for the benefit of
the employees or their beneficiaries. The plan, which must be in
writing and communicated to the employees, must be established as
a permanent and continuing program. Finally, since the plan must
benefit the employees in general, the plan must cover either seventy
per cent of all employees92 or eighty per cent of all eligible employees
if seventy per cent or more of all the employees are eligible to benefit
under the plan.
Not only must the plan be qualified, but the trust also must qualify.
A qualified employees' trust must be organized or created in the
United States and maintained at all times as a domestic trust.93
Investments made by the trust must be for the exclusive benefit of the
employees or their beneficiaries, must not be a prohibited transaction
under section 503, must not result in unrelated business taxable income
under section 511, and must not be operated as a feeder organization.
If all the above requirements are met, then contributions made by
the employer are deductible under section 404(a) so long as they are
an ordinary and necessary business expense and reasonable in amount.
Under a noncontributory plan, the employer, under section 402, includes in his taxable income all amounts received or made available
to him. Section 501(a) and (b) provides that the trust shall be
exempt from federal income tax.
The requirement that the plan be in writing and communicated to
the employees is found, not only in the Internal Revenue Code, but
also in the Labor Management Relations Act and Welfare and Pension
Plan Disclosure Act. Requirements of section 302 of the LMRA are
that the detailed basis on which payments are to be made must be
specified in a written agreement. The agreement need not be signed, 94
and the requirement will be satisfied if the trust agreement is in
existence before payment is made95 and will subsequently be reduced
to writing. While it is better from a drafting viewpoint to write
92. The percentages are applied after excluding certain short service, seasonal and
part-time employees.
93. If a foreign trust meets all the other requirements of § 401(a), employers
making contributions thereunder are allowed deductions within the applicable limits
of § 404(a) (4).
94. William Dunbar Co. v. Painters & Glaziers District Council, 129 F. Supp. 417
(D.D.C. 1955).
95. Bey v. Muldoon, 53 L.R.R.M. 2188 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
96. Van Hoxn.v. Lewis, supra note 50.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VeOL. 18

out the details of the plan so the parties will be cognizant of the
details when they sign, some courts will allow the trustee to decide
the details of the plan7 and in some instances have gone so far as to
allow arbitrators to write the planf 8 However, other courts have
rejected this approach and have held that the plan must contain a
detailed statement and that9 the rules of eligibility should not be left
to the trustees for decision.
Under section 4(a) of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act,
the pension plan must be established by an employer, or by an
employee organization, or by both, for purposes of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries. The act does not define the word
"establishes." The Secretary of Labor has advised that it is reasonable
to conclude that a fund has been established when the employer or
employee organization determines to follow some particular system
or method of providing for the specified benefits. 100
If a plan is to qualify for tax benefits, it must be a definite written
program setting forth all the provisions essential for qualification.' 0 '
In the case of a trustee plan, there must be a valid existing trust,
complete in all respects and recognized as such under applicable
local law. In the case of a nontrustee annuity plan which is evident
only by contracts with an insurance company, the plan is not in
effect until such contracts are executed and issued. In all other
nontrustee plans, the plan may be in effect before the close of the
first taxable year where the appropriate steps are taken to establish
the plan, the insurance contracts have been applied for, the application has been accepted by the insurance company, the contracts or
abstracts have been prepared in sufficient detail defining all terms,
at least a part payment of premiums has been irrevocably made and
the plan has been communicated to the employees.
Under this provision of the Internal Revenue Code, communication
means that the employees are to be apprised of the establishment of
a qualified plan and its salient provisions. While the Service recognizes that the most effective way of doing this is by furnishing each
employee with a copy of the plan, it will allow various substitutes to
be used where this is not feasible. It will be sufficient that a booklet
summarizing the plan in all essential features be furnished the
employees, or that a notice be posted conspicuously on the employer's
bulletin board, stating that a plan has been established, setting forth
97. Ibid.
98. Builders Ass'n v. Greater Kansas City Laborers Dist. Council of the Int'l Hod.
Carriers, 326 F.2d, 867 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917 (1964).
99. Bey v. Muldoon, 54 L.R.R.M. 2642 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
100. Dept. of Labor Interim Memorandum, February 16, 1959.
101. Treas. Reg. 1.401-1(a) (2) (1958). See Rev. Rul. 61-157,
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the type thereof, specifying the eligibility requirements, containing
a synopsis of all benefits provided thereunder, indicating whether
employees are to contribute and, if so, the amount or rate of contributions, and defining the vesting provisions. But in all cases of substitution, the medium used must apprise the employees that a copy of
the complete plan may be inspected at a designated place on the
company's premises during stated times.
A pension plan must also be communicated to the employees
under section 3(2) of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act.
A question might arise whether the employees must be apprised of
the plan in writing by a description of its benefits. It would appear
sufficient for the plan to be communicated orally to the employees so
long as they have an opportunity to see the actual plan in writing.
The participants of the plan need to understand its provisions so
that they may plan intelligently for their retirement. It would be
unfair to the participants for the employer or the union to hold out
exaggerated promises of benefits the plan does not actually provide.
Where the actual plan is not given to the employees, it is necessary
that any substitute contain all important limitations contained in the
plan. Courts have imposed a duty on the trustees to communicate
an adequate picture to the employees of what the pension will do
for them and will hold the trustees to any oversimplified and
exaggerated impression which they have given.10 2 But a mere discrepancy between the plan and the substitute medium should not
afford a sufficient ground for a successful action on the part of any
employee. Also, if the employee is told of the actual plan and is
given an adequate opportunity to see it, then he cannot rely on the
substitute. 103
IV. ADMWnISTRATION OF A PENSION PLAN
A. Administration
The pension fund is a separate entity operated by a board of
trustees. The functions and determinations of this board are of
considerable importance to the fulfillment of the pension program's
purpose. Section 302(c)(5) of LMRA requires that the pension
fund be administered by a joint board of trustees apportioned equally
between union and management. A significant cause of many of the
irregularities found in pension plans is the result of managements
abdication of its responsibility. An employer often takes the position
102. Gediman v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 51 L.R.R.M. 2008 (2d Cir. 1962).
103. Gallo v. Howard Stores Corp., 145 F. Supp. 909, aff'd, 250 F.2d 37 (3rd Cir.
1957).
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that since payments to the fund are in lieu of wages, the money is
the property of the employee to do with as he wishes. This allows
an unscrupulous or incompetent union greater opportunity to divert or
mismanage these funds. By 302(c) (5), Congress intended to eliminate misuse and mismanagement. 10 4 However, the act does not apply
to plans unilaterally established by the employer, plans covering
employees not engaged in interstate commerce, or plans established
prior to 1946.
The collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the
union usually establishes the composition of the board of trustees."'
Section 302 itself contains no provision designating who can be
selected as trustee of a fund. There is no prohibition against union
officers acting as trustees of a pension fund. 1'6 There might be a
possible conflict of interest where members of the union negotiating
committee designate themselves. One question is whether the right
to appoint the union trustees belongs to the union president or the
membership. It would seem that this right belongs initially to the
membership 10 7 unless it authorizes the union president through a
clause in the constitution or a by-law, or in the trust agreement, to
exercise such power. 08
Some or all of the functions may be delegated to an insurance
company, bank, or service organization. Even where control is not
delegated to one of these groups, in most plans this function is
delegated to a paid administrator. There are no cases deciding
whether a union official could be the administrator of the fund. It
seems certain that Congress wanted the trust fund to be jointly
administered by a joint board with equal apportionment. A plan
leaving this to a union official would defeat this purpose.
The members of the board usually serve at the pleasure of their
appointing group. Although a plan may state that a trustee will
serve until his death, resignation or removal, there is usually no
limitation on the removal power. If a plan contains a neutral trustee,
his removal might be limited to violations of his fiduciary relationship
or malfeasance in office. If a vacancy occurs among the appointing
group, his successor usually is appointed from that group. If the
vacancy occurs in the neutral position, both groups will appoint his
successor. To encourage the prompt appointment of a successor and
104. Compare Sanders v. Birthright, 172 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Ind. 1959), with
Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1956).
105. Holton v. McFarland, 52 L.R.R.M. 2842 (D. Alaska 1963).
106. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Employing Bricklayers, 169 F. Supp. 591 (E.D.
Pa. 1959).
107. ibid.
108. Holton v. McFarland, supra note 105.
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to prevent the possible interruption and curtailment of board action,
some plans provide alternative methods to be used in delays in filling
this vacancy.
In order effectively to carry out the administration of the fund,
the trust instrument usually contains regulating procedures to be
used by the board of trustees. This will include the time and notice
of meetings, place of meetings, minutes of meetings, quorums and
voting. Since it is imperative that decisions be reached in every
case, virtually all plans have either neutral members or provide a
procedure for the selection of an impartial arbitrator. If no agreement
is reached as to the selection of an impartial umpire, then under
302(c) (5) (B) of LMRA the parties shall petition the district court
to appoint an arbitrator. The appointed arbitrator can resolve only
issues which the trustees themselves could decide. 10 9
The administration of the fund usually involves the receiving of
applications, the processing of claims, the adoption and interpretation
of rules and regulations, the determination of eligibility, the paying of
benefits, the collecting of contributions, and the reviewing and approving of investments. The board is also given the power to establish bank accounts; pay out reasonable expenses; accumulate reserves;
employ executive, consultant, administrative, clerical, secretarial and
legal personnel; compromise, settle or release claims; invest; buy insurance contracts; invest through commercial trustees; and terminate,
alter, amend, reduce, suspend, or discontinue the plan or any of its
provisions. The major exception to the trustees' power is that the
revision of the basis and amount of the contribution is always reserved
for the contracting parties to determine by collective bargaining.
The employer is usually required to make payments within a
stated period. In order to determine the employer's obligation, the
trustees have the power to enter upon the premises of the individual
employer during business hours, at a reasonable time, and to examine
and copy the applicable books, records, papers or reports of the
employer." 0 Where the employer refuses to contribute, various devices and schemes have been devised to extract the money owed.
The most effective is simply to call the men out on strike. Other
means include clauses giving the trustees the power to sue. When this
power is given, a companion clause will oblige the employer to pay
auditing costs, attorney fees, and court costs. Some plans have
included liquidated damages clauses, but these have been found by
the NLRB not to be mandatory subjects of bargaining."'
109. Barrett v. Miller, 276 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1960), reversing 166 F. Supp. 929

(S.D.N.Y. 1958).

110. Bassen v. Model Iron & Ahiminum Co., 55 L.R.R.M. 2785"(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1964).
111. Excello Dry Wall, 145 N.L.RLB. No. 64, 55 L.R.R.M. 1015 (1963).
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As noted earlier, the trustees of most negotiated plans have the
power to make regulations governing the award of pensions and
eligibility. Such regulations confer a right upon the trustees to deterto
mine who is qualified for a pension.1' 2 In order for this discretion 113
contract.
the
in
stated
explicitly
be
be final and binding, it must
Most courts will not inquire into a decision made in good faith
pursuant to such clauses. 114 Notwithstanding a provision giving the
trustees absolute discretion in determining eligibility, the courts have
held the trustees' actions subject to judicial review limited to determining whether they have breached their fiduciary duty by arbitrary
or capricious action." 5 One court" 6 has gone further and held that
the trustees' decisions on both questions of law and fact are subject
to review. Courts have been quite liberal and will grant relief where
the employee has substantially complied as far as he is able" 7 with
the requirements.
The trustees cannot modify a plan so as to affect vested rights." 8
Where the employee has met the original eligibility requirements, he
is entitled to receive benefits under regulations in effect at the time he
retired. 1 9 Where the trustees modify a plan, they must give notice
of the impending change and a period of grace so as to afford a
reasonable opportunity for employees who qualify under the old plan
to retire. 120 Non-vested rights may be changed retroactively.
B. Investment

A serious threat to the beneficiaries is that the trustees may invest
the pension funds unwisely. The trustees are under a duty to use
reasonable care and skill in investing trust property, that is, such
care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing
with his own property.' 2 ' The objective of investing is to achieve the
greatest possible benefit at the lowest possible cost. The trustee must,
therefore, be concerned with the safety of principal, yield, and
liquidity.
Unions feel that not only should the funds be invested safely, but
112. Lewis v. Jackson & Squire, 86 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Ark. 1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d
1011 (8th Cir. 1950).
113. Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958).
114. Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944); Hurd v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956).
115. Kosty v. Lewis, 53 L.R.R.M. 2341 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F.
Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958).
116. Kennet v. UMW, 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1960).
117. Bednar v. UMW, 34 L.R.R.M. 2163 (D.D.C. 1953).
118. Scoville v. Surface Transit, Inc., 53 L.R.R.M. 2777 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1963).
119. Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
-120. Kosty v. Lewis, supra note 115.
121. 2 Sco-r, TRUSTS § 227 (2d ed. 1956).
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that they also should provide a direct benefit to the employees, such
as investments in government-insured, low-income housing. In In re
Bricklayers, 22 the court held that the trustees are limited to only
those investments which are legal in the state where the fund is
located. Despite this, the courts have permitted considerable latitude
in the investment policies of the trustees. The trustees may invest
pension funds in a building to house the administrative offices of
the fund. 123 If the building was purchased as an investment, the
trustees must show that it is a legal investment under state law. The
trustees may lend money to employees where there is both an adequate reason and adequate collateral. 12 4 In fact, where there is adequate security, funds can be loaned to the employer. 2 5
While it might not be improper to invest in the employer's own
company, such investments violate the principle of diversification and
subject the plan to a double jeopardy-if the employer's earnings
falter, the fund may be deprived not only of promised contributions,
but also of expected return of capital. Furthermore, there is a temptation on the part of the employer to gain an advantage by evaluating
his securities with less objectivity than in arm's length dealings. If
the plan is qualified, Treasury Regulation 1.401-1(b) (5) (i) requires
that funds invested in stocks or securities of, or loaned to, the
employer, be fully disclosed and the reasons and conditions under
which the investments are made given to the Service. The Service
will check to see that the cost does not exceed fair market value,
that a fair return is provided, and that there is sufficient liquidity to
permit distributions in accord with the terms of the plan. Also, under
section 503, a trust will lose its tax exempt status if it should lend
money to an employer without adequate security and a reasonable
rate of interest or if there should be a sale of securities or other
properties between the trust and the employer to the financial detriment of the trust.
C. Information
Effective administration of the fund necessitates availability to the
trustees of facts with respect to the financial condition of the employer.
While some pension trusts contain clauses giving the trustees this
power, generally it is lodged in the union. As early as 1942, the
NLRB held that the employer had a duty to provide the union with
sufficient information to bargain concerning pensions. 12 6 Since the
122. 159 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Pa. 1958).

123. Ibid.
124. United Garment Workers v. Jacob Reed's Sons, 93 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
125. Vaccaro v. Gentile, 138 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
126. Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942).
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cost of a plan is a variable factor, a union needs current actuarial
information and data on pension fund earnings and costs. Lacking
these figures, the union cannot effectively bargain with the employer.
The minimum that the employer must furnish the union is copies of
any plan. 127 In Electric Furnace Co.,'128 the NLRB held that an

employer violated the act by refusing to furnish the union with
information as to deferred vested pension rights that became available
to certain laid-off employees since the requested data was held to
be necessary to the union's formulation of proposals concerning benefits for all employees in the course of liquidation of the employer's
business. Not only must the employer supply such information, but
it must do so promptly, 129 and the information must be accurate. 30

Of course, a union can waive its right to such information,'131 but the
courts will not find a waiver unless it is clear and explicit." 2 If the
trust agreement gives the trustees the right to any information, data,
reports or documents relevant to the administration of the plan, then
it probably would be an unfair labor practice for the employer to
refuse the trustee such information.
Disclosure of information is not only a duty of the employer, it is
also the duty of the trustees. The trustee is under a duty to the
participant to give the latter information about the trust and its
investments. The trustee is also under a duty to keep full and
accurate accounts and, on reasonable demand by the participant, to
render an accounting. One of the purposes of this requirement is to
enable the participants to obtain facts with respect to the operation
of the plan which will permit them to self-police their own funds.
The need for policing was made evident during a Senate investigation.133 These investigations revealed not only wilful abuse, but also

mismanagement and ineptitude in the handling of these funds. Questionable business practices were found to include imprudent and
inefficient management, excessive fees and salaries, inadequate recordkeeping, depletion of reserves, needless expenditures, and a general
laxity in the conduct of the trustees. In addition to mismanagement,
127. Toffenetti Restaurants Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1156 (1962), aft'd, 311 F.2d 219 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 977 (1963).
128. 137 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1962).
129. NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1960).
130. Compare Gallo v. Howard Stores, supra note 103.
131. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951).
132. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964). But see Square D. Company v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 360
(9th Cir. 1964).
133. Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, Final Report on Welfare and
Pension Plans Investigation, S. Rep. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); Hearings
on S. 1994 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor
& Public Welfare, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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these investigations revealed many instances of abuse. The opportunity for malfeasance stems from the common characteristics of funded
plans that contributions are channeled through the trustees and
administrators before being placed in a fund. This has proved to be
too great a temptation in the loosely regulated funds. One of the
worst abuses was found in the procurement of insurance by the
plan's administrator. Improper service fees or administrative allowances paid by the insurance company resulted in illicit gains for the
administrator. Any practice which augments commissions must also
diminish coverage, dividends, credits, or benefits.
In order to regulate these abuses and mismanagement, Congress
enacted the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act in 1958134
which was amended in 1962.135 The act relies heavily on disclosure
through reporting to correct these problems. The theory is that the
beneficiaries will be able to obtain full and accurate information
upon which they can adequately enforce their private rights with a
minimal amount of federal intervention.
The act does not apply to all pension plans. A plan to be covered
must be established by an employer or an employee organization in
an industry affecting interstate commerce; 3 6 must contain at least
twenty-five participants,'137 and must be administered by a governmental body. Where the plan is established solely to comply with
workmen's or unemployment compensation legislation 3 or where the
administration is by a tax exempt fraternal organization, 39 it is
exempt.
Section 5(a) requires that the plan administrator publish
within
ninety days after a plan is established a description of its operations
and an annual report. The term "administrator" is defined as:
5(b) (1) the person or persons designated by the terms of the plan or the
collective bargaining agreement with responsibility for the ultimate control,

disposition or management of the money received or contributed; or
(2) in the absence of such designation, the person or persons actually
responsible for the control, disposition, or management of the money received
134. 72 Stat. 997,29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1958).
135. 72 Stat. 997 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (Supp. V 1959-63).
136. The operation of the act depends on a "de mininus" volume of business.
137. The term "participant" is defined as any employee or former employee of any
employer or any member of an employee organization who is or may become eligible
to receive a benefit of any type from an employee welfare or pension plan, or whose
beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.
138. This provision is only important in those states where compliance with applicable
law may be achieved through an employer administered program. Whether a program
has been developed for the sole purpose of complying with state law is a question of
intent to be derived from the circumstances of the case.
139. Section 4(b) (3) provides that plans administered by fraternal associations
which represent their members for purposes of collective bargaining are not exempt.
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or contributed, irrespective of whether such control, disposition or management is exercised directly or through an agent or trustee designated by such
person or persons.

Problems arise under this definition where the parties have not
drafted a plan naming a designated person. If there is no designated
person, responsibility for meeting the act's publication requirements
falls on those with actual or designated control over and responsibility
for the operations of the plan. Where responsibility for control is
distributed by agreement or practice, it is difficult to determine who
has control. The responsibility should not be placed on those who
perform pure administrative functions or who carry out the everyday
operation of the plan. While what constitutes "control" under the
act is not defined, the Secretary of Labor can give authoritative advice
in doubtful situations.
The act requires that ninety days after the establishment of a
pension plan a description must be published under section 8. The
word "publish" refers to both the duty to file information with the
Secretary of Labor and the duty to mail copies of the information to
beneficiaries of the pension plan. 140 The description must contain:
the name and address of the administrator; his official position; his
relation, if any, to the employer or to the employee organization;
other offices, positions or employment held by him; the name, address,
and description of the plan and the type of administration; the
schedule of benefits; the name, title, and address of any trustee, if
such person is different from the plan administrator; if the plan is
mentioned in a collective bargaining agreement, copies of the plan
or the bargaining agreement, or other instrument under which the
plan was established; the source of financing and the identity of any
organization through which benefits are to be provided; the details
of the bases on which the records of the plan are kept; and the
procedure for presenting and appealing claims. Section 6(b) provides
that the above must be signed and sworn to by the plan administrator.
Any change in this information must be reported to the Secretary of
Labor within sixty days after it has been effected.
The purpose of this section is to provide the plan's participants
with adequate information so that they will be in a better position to
determine their rights under the plan. Also, by revealing information
about the plan's administrator, the participants will know of any possible conflict of interest which might work to their detriment.
Under section 7 of the act, the administrator must file an annual
report. Plans covering less than one hundred participants are exempt
unless the Secretary of Labor, after an investigation, deems that they
140. Kelly v: Struse, Civil No. 27220 (E.D. Pa. March 7; 1960) (unreported).
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should also file a report. Where the plan is unfunded, it is only
necessary to include the total benefits paid; the average number, by
year, of eligible employees during the preceding five years; and, where
applicable, a statement that the plan is underwritten solely by the
general assets of the employer, and the report must specify the total
benefits paid to retired employees.
If funded, the administrator must report: the amount contributed
by each employer and by the employees; the amount of benefits paid
or furnished; the number of employees covered; a statement of assets
specifying the total amount of cash, government bonds, nongovemment bonds and debentures, common stock, preferred stock, common
trust funds, real estate loans and mortgages, operated real estate,
other real estate, and other assets; a statement of liabilities, receipts,
and disbursements; and a detailed statement of salaries, fees, and
commissions.
If insured, the following additional information must be given: the
premium rate or subscription charge, the total premium or subscription
paid to each carrier or organization, and the approximate number of
persons covered by each class of such benefits. The carrier must
report: the total amount of premiums received; the approximate
number of persons covered by each class of benefits; the total claims
paid by such carrier or other organization; dividends or retroactive
rate adjustments, commissions, and administrative services or other
fees or other specific acquisition costs paid by such carrier or other
organization; any amounts held to provide benefits after retirement;
the remainder of such premiums; and the names and addresses of the
brokers, agents, or other persons to whom commissions or fees were
paid, the amount paid each, and for what purpose. Where the carrier
does not maintain separate experience records on the specific groups it
serves, the report may include only the basis of its premium rate, the
total amount of premiums received from the plan, a copy of the
carrier's financial report, and a detailed statement of specific costs in
connection with the acquisition or retention of any particular plan or
plans, if such costs are incurred. The annual report of the funded
pension plan must also include: the type and basis of funding;
actuarial assumptions used in determining the payments under the
contract; and the number of employees, both retired and nonretired,
covered by the contract and, except for benefits completely guaranteedby the carrier, the amount of current and past service liabilities based
on those assumptions and the amount of reserves accumulated under'
the plan.
Where the pension pldn is funded through a trust, this additional
information must be .given: a statement showing the assets of the
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fund which may be elevated either on the basis used in reporting
the fund to the Secretary of the Treasury for tax exemption or the
aggregate cost or present value, whichever is lower; a detailed list,
including cost, present value and percentage of total of all investments of the employer, employee organization or other parties in
interest,141 a detailed list of all loans made to the employer, employee
organization, or other parties in interest, including the terms and
conditions of the loan and the name and address of the borrower.
A pension plan funded through a trust medium must report the type
and basis of funding, actuarial assumptions used, and the amount of
current and past service liabilities.
The purpose of this section is to give the participant a knowledge
of the operation of his plan and the use of its moneys. Despite the
volume of information requested, there are certain gaps and difficulties. While the 1962 amendment removed the word "summary" from
the requirement of a statement of accounts, its effect is limited to
avoiding the opportunity to file sketchy information and the lumping
of fund assets but does not go so far as to require full disclosure of
assets and liabilities. The fact that a finder's fee paid to an individual
to obtain a loan from the plan need not be reported provides a
disguised method for kickback. There are also several ambiguous or
undefined terms in this section. However, since the Secretary of
Labor is authorized to regulate the form and detail of the information required in the plan description and annual report, these words
and terms can be defined in regulation. Also, since he now has the
power to regulate the manner in which the plan is to be executed,
published and filed, he will be able to define when a plan year
occurs.
Disclosure is effected in two ways. Publication of the plan description and annual report must be made to both participants and beneficiaries. This can be done by making the plan available at the
principal office of the plan and, upon written request, by sending an
adequate summary of the report to a participant. Two copies of this
information must be sent to the Secretary of Labor, who must make
them available in the public document room of the Department of
Labor and who may publish any such information where this would
protect the interests of the participants or beneficiaries of the plan.'4
141. "A party in interest is any administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, or
employee of any welfare benefit plan, or an employer any of whose employees are
covered by such a plan or officer or employee or agent of such employer . . . or a
labor organization having members covered by such a plan." The Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act § 3A, 72 Stat. 997 (1958), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 302 (Supp.
V, 1959-63).
142. Such publication- is limited to the contents and descriptions on file with the
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Under section 8 the Secretary is empowered to prepare forms for the
description and annual reports, and use of the forms prescribed for
these purposes has been made mandatory by regulation.
Willful violation of the act is a misdemeanor, punishable under
section 9 by imprisonment for not more than six months or a fine of
not more than 1,000 dollars. Because of a strict definition of willfulness, 143 this section has been rendered meaningless. Section 9(b)
provides that, upon request, if an administrator shall fail or refuse to
publish the description or annual report within thirty days, he may
become liable to that person for 50 dollars per day. An individual who
brings such a suit may be allowed reasonable attorney fees and costs.
Under section 9(f), the Secretary can obtain, under appropriate circumstances, both permanent and temporary injunctions. Section 9(g)
grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear these suits.
The Secretary has the power of section 9(d) to initiate, upon complaint or his own motion, civil investigations where he has reasonable
cause to believe that such investigation may reveal a violation of the
act. Under this power, the Secretary may require the filing of supporting schedules of assets and liabilities; statements in writing and
under oath of any person of any matter under investigation; plan
descriptions and annual reports, as well as certified information for
the completion of annual reports. The Secretary is prohibited from
regulating or interferring with the plan or using his power for a
"fishing expedition." Also, before the Secretary begins his investigation, he must have a certificate from a public accountant based on a
comprehensive audit stating that information contained in the annual
report is true. If the administrator refuses to secure this, the Secretary
can proceed.
Although the statute has secured its purpose-full disclosure-it will
be some time before we will be able to study and report on its effectiveness. One problem with the act is that it discloses the information
to the participant after the plan has started but before he has a
chance to evaluate it. Once the plan has been initiated, the employees
can effect changes through concerted actions leveled at both the
union and the employer. Pressure can be brought against the employer
through the normal weapons of employees' strikes, picketing and
boycotts. It can be brought against the union officials through the
internal workings of the union-removal of elected officials or through
a suit under 501(b) of the LMRDA to correct an abuse in the
Secretary and does not extend to facts which he may learn during an inquiry. 108
CoNc. REG. 1728, 2010 (Feb. 6, 7, 1962).
143. There must be deliberate defiance or persistent refusal in good faith to comply.
H.R. REP. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958).
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handling of funds of union members. 144 It should be noted that the
act itself does not provide an enforceable civil right to correct the
abuse discovered. This will weaken the effect of the statute since it
is unlikely that a participant will sue where he has nothing to gain
for.himself. While it is possible for the states to fill this gap, 14 most
states' 4 do not at present regulate pension funds.
Of course, this gap could be filled by construing section 302(e)
as creating a federal common law regulating pensions. 147 Courts have
used this section to regulate trust expenditures. In Conditioned Air &
Refrigeration Co. v. Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Labor-Management

Trust,'4a the court held that trust funds could not be used to enforce
the collective bargaining agreement, protect wage standards, hire
personne' 49 or provide office space. 150 Beyond regulating expenditures, courts have differed as to the scope of 302(e) jurisdiction. Some
courts have interpreted it very narrowly as merely giving the federal
courts power to prevent unlawful payments to union representatives,' 5 ' while others have held that it confers a broad equity power
regulating the administration of trust funds. 5 2 Neither the language
nor the legislative history supports either position conclusively. If
the Supreme Court ultimately decides that the section confers a
broad jurisdiction, then the courts will have the duty to develop
a complete common law. Such a development, of course, would
144. But see Forline v. Local 42, Int'l Ass'n of Marble Polishers, 211 F. Supp. 315
(E.D. Pa. 1962).
145. The states are not preempted from acting in this area. People v. Automobile
Transporters' Welfare Fund, 53 L.R.R.M. 2878 (N.Y. Ct. of App. 1963), ccrt. denied,
376 U.S. 908 (1964).
146. California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, Washington and Wisconsin
are the only states regulating pension funds.
147. This approach was adopted by the Supreme Court to create a federal common
law of contracts out of a companion section of that act, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 301, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958); Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
148. 159 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Calif. 1956), afftd, 253 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1958).
149. But see Ware v. Adams, 53 L.R.R.M. 2290 (S.D. Cal. 1963). The court held
that section 302 does not prohibit trustees from entering into a business arrangement
with the union under which the union was to provide administrative service for the fund.
150. See also Kroger v. Blassie, 225 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mo. 1964) (office may
not be located in union-owned building). In American Bakeries Co. v. Barrick, 162
F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ohio 1958), the court held that the fund must have completely
separate quarters and independent operations and, therefore, ordered a physical
separation of the union and trustees' offices. But in Ware v. Adams, supra note 149,
the court held that the fund's administrative office could be located in union office
building.
151. Kroger v. Blassie, supra note 150; Employing Plasterers v. Journeymen Plasterers,
186 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. IM. 1960); Sanders v. Birthright, supra note 104; American
Bakeries v. Barrick, supra note 150; Moses v. Ammond, 162 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
152. In re Bricklayers, supra note 122; Copra v. Suro, supra note 104.
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raise the issue of preemption. State courts are already split on the
question. 153 However, following the analogy of section 301, state
courts will not be divested of their jurisdiction."
D. Regulation of Trustees
Another method of regulating the trust is to regulate the trustees.
Under general trust law, the trustee has a duty to administer the
trust solely for the interest of the employee and is subject to judicial
correction upon showing that he acted arbitrarily or capriciously
towards a beneficiary. He is liable for negligence and corruption
and has a duty to disclose all material facts concerning a transaction
of which he has knowledge and must avoid all conflicts of interest.
This duty can be enforced, not only at common law, but also under
section 501 of the LMRDA in the case of a union trustee. An exculpatory provision is ineffective to relieve the trustee of intentional breach
of trust.155
In addition to the common law, the Welfare and Pension Plan
Disclosure Act imposed some restrictions on the trustees. Section 1027
makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than 10,000
dollars, or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both, for
any person to make a false statement or conceal any document required to be published under that act. In addition, Congress, in
section 644, made it a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not
more than 10,000 dollars, or imprisonment of not more than five years,
or both, for any person to embezzle, steal, or unlawfully and willfully
abstract or convert any of the plan's moneys, funds, securities, premiums, credits or other assets. Finally, section 1954 provides a fine
of not more than 10,000 dollars, or imprisonment for not more than
three years, or both, for the offer, acceptance or solicitation of -money,
or other thing of value, for the purpose of influencing the operation
of the plan.
Section 13 requires that administrators, officers, and employees of
the plan who handle the property of the plan must be bonded unless
underwritten solely by the general assets of the union or the employer.
The bond must not be less than ten per cent of the total funds handled,
except that it must be at least 1,000 dollars and canb-6I6ss than
153. Courts holding that they were preempted: In re Bricklayers, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d
468 (1957); State v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 120 Utah 294, 233 P.2d 685 (1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951). Courts holding that they were not preempted:
Cox v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 855, 346 P.2d 15 (1959); In re Thacher, 10 N.Y.2d
439, 224 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1962).
154. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The law to be applied would be.
federal law.
155. RESTATinEmNT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 222 (1959).
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500,000 dollars if the Secretary of Labor has not prescribed otherwise.
It can be individual or schedule in form and protects only against
fraud or dishonesty. Duplicate bonding is eliminated by making this
the sole bonding statute under federal law where a fund would come
under this act 56 and by preempting state laws under section 16. The
bond must be secured from a company acceptable to the Secretary
of Labor which does have an interest in or control over the fund. The
Secretary may accept other arrangements as an indication of financial
responsibility. Finally, the Secretary is given power to issue regulations concerning the bonding provision.
V.

CONCLUSION

Generally, labor laws are lengthy, overly complex statutes with
many ramifications. The law with regard to pensions is no exception.
Although these statutes touch many phases of law, of necessity, my
discussion has been limited to certain aspects in the establishment and
administration of these funds, as examples of the types of problems
that can arise. This does not mean that there are not other major
areas in pension planning which involve labor relations law or that
these areas are not interrelated with the areas discussed. The scope,
magnitude, and scheme of collectively bargained pension plans should
make it evident that we are not dealing with a settled and fixed
phenomenon but with an intricately structured system whose problems
are just appearing on the surface. Only time will render the answers.
However, it can be safely assumed that whatever direction this new
dimension takes, it will affect not only the employers, unions, and
employees involved, but the whole social process in America. Significantly, it should be noted that the federal government has not established a minimum mandatory set of standards for pensions outside
of the exceptions noted in the article. Although this study reveals
certain gaps in federal regulation, particularly in regard to the investment policies, vesting of benefits and the right of an employee to
bring a suit, further extensive governmental regulation does not appear
to be warranted or desirable at this time.
156. Thus §§ 13 and 502 of the Labor Management Relations Act would apply to
union funds which came within the act's jurisdiction.

